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Abstract
Pilot projects are increasingly used as a mechanism to 
enact organisational change, particularly government pol-
icy. Information technology's centrality to organisations 
often makes it key to the introduction of new processes. 
However, it can give rise to workarounds as employees 
circumvent impediments it presents by rejecting its pre-
scribed use. Workarounds tend to be conceptualised di-
chotomously, as either ‘good’ problem solving, or ‘bad’ 
subversion of the technology. In pilot projects, worka-
rounds are more ambiguous because those that support 
projects' successful completion in the short- term may un-
dermine day to day operations longer term. We draw on 
interview data from a policy pilot in general practice in 
the National Health Service in England aimed at extend-
ing access to care. We problematise the dichotomous 
conceptualisation of workarounds, finding they can be 
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INTRODUCTION
Many contemporary organisational change projects hinge on IT as an enabler of change, and it is 
within this context that the issue of workarounds arises. Workarounds have been defined as technol-
ogy non- use, finding other ways to achieve work without using the technology, or use of technology 
other than as intended (Gasser, 1986). In certain literatures on organisational change, workarounds 
have long been problematised because they can undermine the intended benefits of change projects 
(Debono et al., 2010). In others, however, they are celebrated as examples of skillful and heroic im-
provisation (Dupret, 2017). Workarounds can be considered akin to the hidden ‘materialisation work’ 
required to make information systems, data management and information governance processes work-
able (Jones, 2019).
Thus, a range of perspectives on workarounds conceptualises them variously as an inevitable as-
pect of organisations/work or as unethical or risky deviations from formal procedures (Alter, 2014). 
We argue that this portrayal has shaped a dichotomous understanding of workarounds as either ‘good’ 
or ‘bad’ that we frame as characterising the ‘ambiguity’ of workarounds. This ambiguity of work-
arounds in relation to organisational change, and to projects in particular, as a ubiquitous mechanism 
of organisational change, has been under- explored. This article aims to address this by developing in-
sights into the role of workarounds in pilot projects as an instance of organisational change, grounded 
in an empirical case study of a UK policy pilot in primary health care in the NHS (Bailey et al., 2017; 
Elvey et al., 2018). By exploring how ambiguous workarounds intersect with pilot projects, we aim 
to contribute to theory on workarounds, and secondly to understand the implications of workarounds 
for organisations and for the workforce and during and after organisational change projects and pilots. 
The article addresses the question: how do workarounds influence the role of pilot projects in bringing 
about organisational change?
Policy pilots act as an initiation phase for government- led innovation in public services, often in-
volving significant organisational change. They incorporate opportunities to explore alternative ways 
of achieving policy aims, entailing openness to policy formulation, testing and adjustment (Mulgan 
and Albury, 2003). Policy pilots may have one or more goals, including experimentation, early adopter 
implementation, learning about ‘what works’, or demonstration of proof of concept (Ettelt et al., 
2015). As such they involve multiple, often overlapping and ambiguous purposes which are frequently 
not made explicit (Ettelt et al., 2015), or which emerge through individual pilot projects (Bailey et al., 
2017, 2019). Policy pilots tend to involve disruption of established arrangements in organisations 
and enable a break with what are seen as problematic ways of working, to provide opportunities to 
reconfigure work practices in novel and more effective ways (Arnold, 2015). This experimental di-
mension has led to a conception of pilots as a form of open or participatory policymaking; offering 
simultaneously supportive and undermining of policy pi-
lots. Workarounds thereby become political, as employees 
are required to trade- off consequences for themselves and 
the wider organisation.
K E Y W O R D S
health care, information technology, organisational change, policy 
pilots, projects, workarounds
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empowerment to individuals working within local services who can bring their own ideas for practice 
to bear upon emergent policy problems (Ettelt et al., 2015; Bailey et al., 2017). At the same time, their 
equivocality leaves scope for the use of pilots as political devices that provide evidence and legitimacy 
for a pre- determined approach by demonstrating ‘success’ and constraining experimentation and po-
tential for adjustment (Arnold, 2015; Ettelt et al., 2015; Nair and Howlett, 2016; Bailey et al., 2019), 
while rhetorically suggesting otherwise (Nair and Howlett, 2016).
The larger study from which this analysis is drawn explored the role of local actors in creating 
policy, providing the backdrop to this article's focus on the ways in which frontline staff enable or 
undermine the policy pilot through the use of workarounds.
The policy objective in this study was to extend patients' access to health care, which required 
the implementation of digital data sharing between healthcare organisations to enable the trialing of 
different modes of inter- organisational working that might support the objective. This was far from 
straightforward in practice because collaborating organisations have distinct local technology- related 
work practices and use differing IT systems that lack interoperability. This therefore positioned the 
pilot as hinging on technological change that entailed negotiating solutions to disparate technical 
platforms, capabilities and practices in order to be able to share data. By attending to what might be 
the simultaneously enabling and detrimental effects of workarounds on policy pilots, we are able to 
examine wider tensions within the politics of change projects between autonomy, empowerment and 
risk for frontline workers. Additionally, our argument draws attention to the recursive influence of the 
informal and emergent nature of decisions made within pilots upon the longer- term functioning of the 
systems in which they are embedded. We start by introducing the ongoing debate about workarounds 
and how they are conceptualised as either constructive, reflecting bounded rationality in planning and 
the complexity of work arrangements; or risky and problematic, reflecting critical technology work 
design failings.
We then present the details of the policy pilot and the methods used in the study before presenting 
empirical findings in relation to workarounds. We begin with a thematic analysis of workarounds 
conceptualised positively, as supportive of the pilot, or conceptualised negatively, as undermining the 
pilot. We then go on to consider what workarounds conceptualised in this way mean for the workforce 
and for organisations in organisational change, acknowledging tensions between short and long- term 
objectives and multiple goals.
We conclude that workarounds are both a necessary part of pilot projects and sources of risk, 
not only in terms of good governance and safety but also in relation to the sustainability of changed 
practices for the organisation and their consequences for workers. This article offers a contribution by 
proposing a nuanced understanding of the relationship between workarounds and pilot projects, and 
in producing a political theorisation of workarounds that is sensitive to interplay of their temporal 
dimensions. More specifically, this article builds on theory about projectification and policy pilots by 
theorising the implications of workarounds in pilot projects for frontline workers.
IT, workarounds and organisational change
Pilot projects have become a widespread mechanism for testing and rolling out organisational change 
such as policy interventions (Mulgan and Albury, 2003). Given the centrality of IT in contemporary 
organisations, such pilots also necessarily involve IT- led change. In turn, IT- led change/implementa-
tions have long been associated with workarounds (Gasser, 1986; Ferneley and Sobreperez, 2006; 
Safadi and Faraj, 2010, Davison et al., 2019).
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In particular, workarounds draw attention to the embedding of assumptions about users' work prac-
tices within the design of systems. Technology designed without sufficient involvement of users tends 
to reflect formal understandings of work practices that can be significantly out of step with the (in-
formal) realities of how work is done (Petrakaki and Kornelakis, 2016). Understanding how and why 
workarounds of information systems arise is important in order to create a better fit between systems 
and work practices (Blijleven et al., 2017).
Gasser (1986) defines a workaround as technology non- use, finding other ways to achieve work 
without using the technology, or use of technology other than as intended. Others define workarounds 
as alternative work strategies to circumvent blocks or impediments presented by new technologies 
(Koopman and Hoffman, 2003; Halbesleben et al., 2008). Kobayashi et al. (2005) propose the notion 
of workarounds as informal practices that deviate from standard workflow, introducing a normative 
dimension to the discussion of workarounds that reflects user- resistance and rejection of new tech-
nologies (Boonstra et al., 2004; Ferneley and Sobreperez, 2006; Davison et al., 2019). This occurs 
particularly where ‘off the shelf’ and otherwise standardised systems that formalise certain modes of 
working are at odds with fluid, messy and informal work practices (Petrides et al., 2004; Petrakaki and 
Kornelakis, 2016; Al- Masslawi et al., 2017). Workarounds can be framed as a creative local response 
to the failure of standardised information systems to meet local information needs (Petrides et al., 
2004; Petrakaki and Kornelakis, 2016; Al- Masslawi et al., 2017). The notion of workarounds there-
fore presumes an infrastructure of organisational rules, practices and norms that are worked around 
by employees (Alter, 2014).
A number of descriptions of workarounds in the literature allude to their temporary nature 
(Kobayashi et al., 2005; Morrison, 2015). Nonetheless, the temporal dimensions of workarounds re-
main largely unexplored, and few studies consider their longer- term impact on work, workers and 
organisations. An exception is Morrison's (2015) study, which notes that the use of workarounds 
as short- term responses to increased workload at the manufacturing front line has long- term conse-
quences in terms of establishing and perpetuating resource shortages. In this respect, workarounds 
may carry a hidden cost if they go beyond being temporary responses to become crystallised and 
ingrained, when they can generate new problems, for example by producing new information silos 
(Petrides et al., 2004; Davison et al., 2019).
The inherent informality of workarounds makes them invisible practices (Star and Strauss, 1999), 
such that they permit impediments to workflow to be perpetuated by circumventing rather than seek-
ing to resolve them. This can give rise to a reliance on workarounds in which users routinely circum-
vent official processes (Debono et al., 2010; Davison et al., 2019). Here a gap opens up between the 
expected outcomes from new policy- led practices (such as better access to care for patients), and the 
realities, so that evaluations of work may be flawed and inaccurate (Debono et al., 2010; Campbell, 
2011).
Workarounds become a topic of concern within more functionalist literatures where deviation 
from prescribed modes of practice with systems is deemed problematic. One way to understand this 
perspective is through the lens of safety systems. A ‘Safety I’ view sees organisations as relatively 
closed, stable and predictable, and therefore able to be made failsafe (Jerak- Zuiderent, 2012; Sujan 
et al., 2016). Within ‘high reliability’ and safety critical domains, this gives rise to standardisation of 
systems and practices as a means of controlling or reducing their variability and exerting control to 
manage risk (Azad and King, 2008; Halbesleben et al., 2008). Therefore, workarounds in such set-
tings have been seen as aspects of suboptimal processes that need to be eliminated (Azad and King, 
2008; Halbesleben et al., 2008). There is an assumption, therefore, within the Safety I perspective 
that workarounds can and should be avoided through protocolising work. By exercising a high level 
of control over workers' activities, through highly prescriptive manuals, for example, improvisation 
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is discouraged and a minimum level of performance maintained (Orr, 1996). In health care, where 
ensuring patient safety dominates the organisation of work, workarounds have typically been seen as 
potential sources of harm because they bypass standard processes implemented for the purposes of 
safe care (Spear and Schmidhofer, 2005; Blijleven et al., 2017).
Perspectives on safety have shifted over time from a representation of organisations as relatively 
predictable to one that sees organisations as more changeable. This shift reflects recognition that the 
orthodox understanding of safety presumes a static and mechanistic organisational environment that 
is at odds with the fluid and responsive character of much healthcare work (Jerak- Zuiderent, 2012). 
Again, a safety lens offers an alternative perspective on standardisation and protocols with the ‘Safety 
II’ perspective in which the organisational image is dynamic, the environment is complex, and activi-
ties are situated and responsive to change. With increased understanding of the value of improvisation 
in complex and evolving work environments, workarounds become framed more positively in the 
literature as ‘adaptive routines’ (Kobayashi et al., 2005; Sujan et al., 2016), ‘coping mechanisms’ 
(Morrison, 2015) and ‘inventive solutions’ (Petrides et al., 2004) that enable organisations to be re-
sponsive to changing internal and external environments. The Safety II perspective therefore positions 
workarounds as a necessary element of adaptive and dynamic trade- offs that enable safety to be main-
tained (Sujan et al., 2015; de Carvalho et al., 2018).
However, this split between Safety I and Safety II perspectives sets up a paradox in relation to 
the question of how professionals in dynamic organisations are able to act effectively rather than 
in a haphazard way in response to changing circumstances. The Safety II perspective depends upon 
the idea that professionals are able to act under unpredictable circumstances precisely because their 
decisions are underpinned by a body of knowledge that implies a set of stable rules and protocols 
(Jerak- Zuiderent, 2012). Rather than abstract ‘textbook’ knowledge, it is the ability of professionals 
to accurately appraise the context and act appropriately that is of value (Contu and Willmott, 2003).
Contrary to the prevailing assumption that safety is increased by reducing uncertainty and thereby 
errors, safety protocols can threaten rather than enhance safety under some circumstances if rules 
are followed slavishly when circumstances call for different actions (Jerak- Zuiderent, 2012; Dupret, 
2017). Indeed innovation, which policy pilots seek, calls for the judicious breaking of rules (Mulgan 
and Albury, 2003).
Organisations may formally co- opt workarounds that help make things work, which may then act 
as a source of incremental improvement to work processes (Halbesleben et al., 2008; Morrison, 2015) 
and support implementation by highlighting aspects of poor system design (Debono et al., 2010). In 
this respect, workarounds embody employee improvisation and creativity in response to organisa-
tional challenges (Petrides et al., 2004; Campbell, 2011; Dupret, 2017). Workarounds can enable pro-
fessionals to balance the requirements of ‘sound’ work, professional norms, ethics, values and local 
practices with the requirements of new, technology- led work practices (Dupret, 2017).
Here, then, we have two contrasting views of workarounds. The first sees a workaround as avoid-
able, disruptive, risky and indicative of suboptimal design and poorly controlled work processes. The 
other sees a workaround as an inevitable, necessary, skillful response that maintains workflow and 
mitigates error and failure in contingent circumstances.
Contemporary organisational IT implementations require that IT users not only take it upon them-
selves to shape technology artefacts ‘under the radar’, customising them to local work practices and 
information needs; it also means that users are implicitly expected and indeed required to take on this 
role, making them active producers of the implemented product (Pollock, 2005; Safadi and Faraj, 
2010; Davison et al., 2019). Workarounds can be seen as one such form of essential local configura-
tion work. The shifting of configuration work onto organisations and users as a means of more effec-
tively tailoring systems to local circumstances (Safadi and Faraj, 2010) reflects broader social trends 
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that have moved towards user self- service and prosumption. In this respect, it has been argued that 
information systems survive in organisations as a consequence of the skill of professionals in enabling 
technologies to dovetail with work practices— the ‘work to make technology work’ (Nicolini, 2006; 
Dupret, 2017).
Insofar as workarounds constitute a bricolage and ‘making do’ with the resources at hand in order 
to get the job done through informal, non- prescribed means, they can be considered a type of ‘articu-
lation work’ (Star and Strauss, 1999). If we accept that workarounds are commonplace, indispensable 
and integral to, rather than outside of, formal ‘work’, then the boundaries between workarounds and 
formal organisation are blurred (Pollock, 2005). This opens up a need to explore the implications of 
workarounds for employees who are actively, yet somewhat invisibly, implicated in organisational 
change. In so far as there is scope for workarounds to either help or hinder change projects, this 
perspective focuses attention on ‘shopfloor’ employees exercising power through resisting change, 
or exercising agency in using their tacit knowledge of local processes to configure new practices to 
better fit local needs. We now consider the context of our examination of workarounds— policy pilot 
projects.
Projects and pilots
Policy piloting aims to foster innovation and develop solutions to real- world policy problems by de-
marcating a zone of licensed creativity intended to enable local actors delivering services, or ‘street 
level bureaucrats’ (Arnold, 2015), to explore and define solutions that might offer generalisable mod-
els and lessons for other areas (Martin and Sanderson, 1999). In so doing, policy pilots are a mode 
of policymaking that conspicuously aims for empowerment of local initiative, in which the detailed 
adaptation of work practices and the crafting of solutions are delegated to the shop floor (Bullock 
et al., 2001). This is in marked contrast to traditional policymaking in which blueprints for change are 
pre- determined and therefore abstracted from local context, knowledge and expertise (Harrison and 
Wood, 1999). Instead, good ideas are allowed to emerge from practice (Harrison and Wood, 1999). 
Policy pilots therefore appear to offer empowerment for employees, access to local knowledge for 
better local adaptation of policy for project managers, and, ultimately, more effective policy (Bullock 
et al., 2001).
Policy pilots are a specific form of project, and as such manifest certain characteristics that are 
of relevance to this study. Projects are temporary, time- bound modes of working that have become 
increasingly prevalent as a form of organising (Sjöblom et al., 2013; Aroles et al., 2019). Projects 
promise to produce their desired outcomes by a given deadline through rational planning, presenting 
a notion of ‘smoothness’, control and predictability by virtue of the processes and activities of project 
management (Hodgson, 2004).
However, the rise of project forms of organising has been accompanied by critique of ‘projectifi-
cation’, that argues that these assumptions are flawed, and that projects can have profoundly negative 
consequences for work, organisations and workers (Sjöblom et al., 2013).
During a pilot project, the change being trialed is separated and desynchronised from other ongoing 
organisational processes (Bailey et al., 2019). Projects therefore operate outside of the organisation's 
bureaucratic processes of managing activity and, because of this, they are seen as a means of enabling 
creative reimagining of how work might be organised – a promise of both ‘controllability and adven-
ture’ (Sahlin- Andersson and Söderholm, 2002), and of innovating through policy implementation. In 
policy pilots, therefore, the project format implies a transition from the change project to ‘business as 
usual’ working (Bailey et al., 2019).
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Policy pilots are reliant on the expertise of frontline staff, drawing on and often codifying their 
local knowledge (Arnold, 2015). In so doing, they may be considered both empowering and exploit-
ative. Projects encourage extraordinary, heroic effort on the part of employees to make the project 
‘successful’ that arises from the mismatch of ‘idealised’ rational planning and the reality of the work 
required (Cicmil et al., 2016). Projectified work engenders vulnerability among employees because 
of the requirement for repeated extraordinary effort and exposure to risks (Cicmil et al., 2016). Risks 
arise from the temporariness and instability of project work, including the loss of secure relations, 
sense of reputation, achievement and professionalism that must be serially performed (Ekman, 2015; 
Cicmil et al., 2016). In other respects, policy pilots can be seen as empowering frontline staff by pro-
viding opportunities to use their expertise to shape changes that will affect their own work practices 
and in a general sense conceding them influence and ‘voice’. Participation in policy piloting therefore 
carries inherent tensions related to the extent to which it permits both flexibility and control in prac-
tice. The article takes off from this tension by advancing the notion that workarounds are potentially 
both empowering and problematic for employees, and that they are essential to the success of policy 
pilots and, paradoxically, undermine the capacity of organisations to fully implement policy.
CASE STUDY
The ‘tech revolution in healthcare’ heralded by Secretary of State for Health and Social Care Matt 
Hancock seeks to bring about transformations in how health care is delivered, enabled by information 
technologies (NHS Digital, 2018). However, technology- led change is notoriously challenging, and 
experiences of IT- led change programmes in the NHS, notably the National Programme for IT (House 
of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2013), have been particularly fraught.
It has been observed that the NHS is a particularly challenging context in which to enact change 
because of its fragmented and complex structures, regulation, underfunding and diverse user- 
stakeholders (Asthana et al., 2019). However, this situation is neither unique to the NHS, nor to the 
healthcare sector (Omar et al., 2017).
The case study that forms the basis for this article is that of a policy pilot in one of 27 semi- 
autonomous regional teams designated by the national body responsible for planning and contracting 
health services; NHS England. During a brief period of relative autonomy over its budget, the team 
invited a set of regional NHS healthcare organisations to propose and trial solutions to the policy aim 
of extending access to care, with an emphasis on service integration and the use of technology. The bid 
process allocated up to £500,000 of funding each for proposals from collaborations between health-
care organisations within certain local health economies, of which 6 bids were funded. In the majority 
of cases, pilots were led by General Practitioners (GPs).
General Practice is the mainstay of primary care and the first point of contact for patients seeking 
health care, leading treatment of patients and acting as a gatekeeper to secondary care services. GPs, 
also known as ‘family doctors’, also interface with social care organisations, such as care homes, 
particularly for elderly and vulnerable patients. Recent NHS reforms have sought to improve the co-
ordination between primary and social care in addition to reducing hospital admissions, and the use 
of A&E services in particular (NHS England, 2019), and the policy pilot reflected these high level 
policy objectives. In the four GP- led pilots, the main component of the pilot was extending surgery 
opening hours into evenings and weekends. In order to do this, the pilots proposed a ‘hub’ model, in 
which one practice would host an extended hours service on behalf of several practices within a spec-
ified area. In the remaining two pilots, which were led by the local commissioning group, the main 
component was a ‘step down’ service, in which secondary care staff provided services in care homes 
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and other community settings in order to help prevent hospital admissions. In all cases, the innovation 
came to revolve strongly around IT because the pilots required inter- organisational collaboration that 
in practice relied on the ability of organisations to share clinical and administrative information about 
patients in digital form.
Healthcare organisations including GP practices, hospitals and community health organisations 
frequently use differing software for patient records systems, which tends to confound or complicate 
direct electronic exchange of patient records data between organisations. Even where organisations 
use the same software, its customisation, often over many years in response to particular local needs, 
hinders compatibility between different systems in practice. In the case of general practices, these 
same systems are also the means by which they are paid by government through enabling practices to 
report on their activities and to produce ‘evidence’ for such reports. These factors represent complex 
barriers to change, as information sharing is circumscribed by organisational boundaries, without data 
sharing agreements, making information governance considerations crucial to this pilot.
METHODOLOGY
This article draws on semi- structured interviews conducted as part of the qualitative process evalua-
tion element of the study, comprising interviews, documentary analysis and observations, and situated 
within a larger mixed methods study (Bailey et al., 2017). It sought to understand how policy was 
being made by local actors, how pilots contributed to policymaking and how organisational change 
was being conducted in the public sector (Bailey et al., 2017). Purposive sampling was used, deter-
mined by the characteristics of the case study sites and to capture a range of viewpoints from strategic 
and operational levels within general practices and other organisations involved (Elvey et al., 2018). 
Details of the 6 sites and their respective briefs for the pilot are included in Table A1. Analysis was 
conducted using NVivo 10 on 72 semi- or unstructured interviews with staff involved in the policy 
pilot at the six participating NHS sites in England. Interviews included open- ended questions about 
the project, its aims and the context in which it had developed, participants' roles, experiences of 
working in the pilot, and perspectives on what was working well, what was not working well and pos-
sible reasons why (Elvey et al., 2018).
Formal ethical approval was not required for the study since it was classified by NHS governance 
procedures as service evaluation. However, all participants received an information sheet and pro-
vided written consent to the recording of their interview and use of their data.
An open coding framework was developed using broad categories drawn from primary content 
analysis of the data: ‘policy’, ‘enablers’, ‘context’, ‘pilots’, ‘open codes’ and ‘lists’ (Bailey et al., 
2017). A second phase of thematic analysis established a more extensive framework of 60 codes 
representing themes or topics discussed during interview, which were then grouped according to the 
broader categories first identified (Bailey et al., 2017).
Having observed through the initial analysis both the frequency with which workarounds appeared 
in the data, and their importance for sustaining pilot objectives, a subset of the research team re-
viewed coded data related to information systems and workarounds. These included the following 
six additional codes identified by cross- referencing ‘workarounds’ in NVivo: ‘enablers’, ‘IT’, ‘trust’, 
‘sustainability’, ‘state of exception’ and ‘supporting infrastructure’. Participants' narratives about 
workarounds deployed by themselves or others were identified in the data within those codes, along 
with the justifications and underlying intentions attributed to them. In the case of rule- breaking, as 
workarounds are often considered to be, the construction of intentions is important in so far as they 
are social acts that invoke different forms of ordering (Busby and Iszatt- White, 2015). The distinction 
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between ordering as coordinative and ordering as reflective of values and social mores enables indi-
viduals to break rules while rationalising to themselves and others that their actions are nonetheless 
compatible with maintaining order (Busby and Iszatt- White, 2015). Therefore, understanding justifi-
cations and intentions was central to our analysis of workarounds.
Themes were generated inductively from the workarounds we found in our data. We considered 
these in terms of how they are represented workarounds, either positively (conceptualised as articula-
tion work), or negatively (conceptualised as disruption, subversion or resistance to the pilot). In each 
case, we considered the implications of workarounds for their contribution to the situation at hand— 
the pilot itself— but also the longer- term implications of workarounds becoming embedded in routine 
practice.
CONCEPTUALISING AND CATEGORISING WORKAROUNDS
The findings set out below capture workarounds across multiple interpretations of the pilot, that is 
different sites and briefs. Workarounds arose when the prescribed information sharing mechanisms 
between collaborating organisations were circumvented by one or other of the parties. For each site, 
information sharing mechanisms critical to the collaborative brief are listed in Table A1. Those de-
ploying workarounds were reception staff at ‘hub’ practices, A&E staff, a care home case manager, 
GPs and out of hours GPs, ambulance service staff and hospital managers.
We now examine instances of workarounds in the empirical data, considering how they are con-
ceptualised (e.g. positively or negatively) by those performing them, through a contextualised inter-
pretation of intent and justification by participants. In doing so, we identify the principle meanings 
underlying the workarounds in our study in relation to their roles within the pilot as enabling and 
supportive, or undermining and disruptive of the pilot.
Workarounds as disruption, subversion or resistance
A number of workarounds can be characterised negatively in so far as they involved rejecting use of 
the technology as prescribed by the new work practices. This therefore hampered the pilot. Reasons 
given by individuals deploying these workarounds were that proposed new arrangements and pro-
cesses conflicted with local interpretations of information governance or were found to be impractical 
because they generated additional work.
For example, as part of the pilot, telehealth consultations were to be held between GPs at a surgery, 
the nursing home case manager and the patient at a participating nursing home, to improve access 
to care for patients in nursing homes. However, these consultations were difficult to implement in 
practice because of the need to synchronise schedules and set up equipment in particular spaces for 
specific time slots during which professionals had to remain available. Under such circumstances, the 
nursing home case manager reverted to telephone liaison with GPs, expressing their preference for 
simpler and more familiar technology and processes:
You've got to have the basics right before you can introduce something like teleconfer-
encing, So, the care homes have got to be on board, they've got to buy into it, we've found 
that it's got to fit in with their regime which has been very difficult because trying to find 
a time when it fits in with them…so it's all been to do with timings.
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Alternatively, non- compliance in the use of new systems and processes sometimes involved rejection 
of the principles upon which they were based. For example, the pilot sought to enable better coordination 
between primary care and A&E by enlisting A&E staff to book patients a GP follow- up via a shared ap-
pointment booking system. However, due to disagreements with participating GPs about interpretations 
of information governance, A&E staff were unwilling to use the shared system. A GP stated that:
Because A&E can't use the system because of issue at their end we're trying to open it up 
now so patients can just access it themselves
Information governance was again a point of contention where a GP care diary had to be changed to 
fit the hospital's differing interpretation of information governance before both parties would engage with 
the process being piloted:
The diary would ask for date of birth and their view was date of birth is too specific, put 
age on so it's not as identifiable
Other non- compliance workarounds involved staff avoiding duplication of work. For example, hospital 
staff would not use a system shared with GPs to refer patients to the GP mental health clinic because it 
entailed additional work for them:
If it takes three minutes longer, if it's difficult to do it just won't get done. So whatever 
system we're putting into the demonstrator sites has got to be as easy as, if not easier 
than, the system that they're working with now, because that extra three minutes they 
won't have.
Still further ‘non- compliance’ workarounds reflected competing priorities arising within the pilot. For 
example, a hub practice was designated to provide additional appointments out of hours to patients from 
a number of local practices, supported by out of hours GPs (from outside the hub practice). The out of 
hours GPs had not been trained to use the hub's clinical system (‘EMIS’) and found it too difficult to use, 
so they reverted to using their usual clinical system (‘Adastra’) when seeing patients.
Now all the time you've got a GP in there with patients outside coming in. It wasn't 
working. You have to make a decision to, right, stop what you're doing and work on the 
Adastra system until we can revisit this.
This kind of workaround reflects professionals' commitment to patients over and above success of the 
pilot. It evidenced prioritisation of upholding professional values related to patient- centredness in spite of 
the pilot when it threatened to compromise professionals' ability to effectively deliver care. What might be 
characterised from a project management or managerial perspective as ‘resistance’ might also therefore 
be seen as adhering to higher principles related to the primacy of patient care, and/or upholding systems 
of governance and accountability.
Workarounds as constructive local articulation work
Workarounds that could be characterised positively were those in which staff performed work outside 
their usual procedures as a means of facilitating the integration of the processes and practices being 
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piloted. For example, at one site ambulance service professionals collaborated with GPs to identify 
the services' regular users for unplanned, acute hospital visits, in order to enable more targeted GP 
intervention and to better keep those patients out of hospital. However, as the ambulance service des-
patch systems did not link individual patients with their GPs, ambulance service professionals instead 
produced reports manually from their system for onwards referrals to GPs. This workaround arose 
because organisational information systems were not able to accommodate the information require-
ments of the collaborative processes being piloted. Here, the challenges of rapidly aligning different 
organisations' existing information systems and processes brought lack of interoperability to the fore.
This workaround reflected a commitment to making the pilot work in the short- term, although it 
involved additional work for those staff. The short- term focus on getting through the pilot is apparent 
in a number of workarounds that could not be expected to be sustained indefinitely, particularly where 
they involved inefficient manual or paper- based processes.
At practices designated as out of hours ‘hubs’, reception staff managed appointment bookings 
for all participating practices. These staff found that they had to log into six separate systems, each 
belonging to a different collaborating practice, in order to be able to make appointments for patients. 
Although a technical solution was devised to create a single virtual practice to simplify hub appoint-
ment bookings, it was not set up during the pilot. This meant that the necessary technical functionality 
was deferred to the future, forcing reception staff to bridge the gap through handling additional work 
and work complexity. Deferral enabled the project to get ‘over the finish line’ without fully resolving 
issues that may take time to address.
At the moment we log onto six, all six different sites, and you've got them all on the bot-
tom, and you're clicking in on one and then the other
This workaround, which was essential to the pilot's success, came at the cost of onerous processes for 
staff. There were a number of instances in this study of workarounds of what were perceived as problem-
atic processes in one area generating workarounds in other areas. For example, hospital managers would 
not allow in- reach GPs to access their urgent care dashboard for information governance reasons, so ward 
managers manually produced lists for GPs.
We had an urgent care dashboard, which practices access and they can see patient names, 
who've been admitted the day before. But because of data security we couldn't handle 
patient identifiable information, so the dashboard went down. So we haven't been able to 
use that, so we had to do a work around, which meant that one of the directorate manag-
ers at the hospital has to press a button to say all the patients admitted the previous week, 
give it to the GP who goes through and looking for her patients, so it's a bit of a faff.
This instance demonstrates how a workaround by hospital staff necessitated use of a workaround by 
ward managers. Similarly, non- compliance with use of the care diary by the hospital staff to book GP ap-
pointments for patients on the basis of their interpretation of information governance rules (which differed 
from that of GPs), obliges the GPs or their patients to deploy a workaround. Such additional work puts 
pressure on professionals that may be acceptable to them only for the duration of the pilot. Many of the 
conceptualisations of workarounds in the case study can therefore be concurrently seen as problematic for 
subverting prescribed work practices and as constructive articulation work. Having examined how work-
arounds can be conceptualised in different and changing ways, we turn now to discuss the implications of 
these findings for pilot projects, for organisations and for the workforce.
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DISCUSSION
The conceptualisation of workarounds in positive or negative terms depends on the perspective of the 
reporter in relation to how they are interpreted and either justified or problematised. Their ambiguity 
arises from the co- existence of distinct perspectives: those of staff deploying the workaround, and 
those of policymakers and others advancing and advocating the change that is being worked around. 
The latter might be framed as the ‘project perspective’. We have characterised workarounds in our 
data negatively when they were disruptive of the pilot because they involved working around the new 
processes and practices that the pilot was meant to test out. By contrast, we have characterised worka-
rounds that supported the pilot as positive where they facilitated the new collaborative processes and 
practices that operationalised its aims. They did so through the skillful bridging of gaps by employees 
between new systems and processes and existing ones. While different roles have differing scopes for 
autonomy and task discretion (Petrakaki and Kornelakis, 2016), a range of employee roles deployed 
workarounds.
Learning
Although some workarounds, including non- use by hospital staff of the GP care diary, have been 
characterised negatively, they also revealed issues that needed to be addressed in order for piloted 
practices to be established in the longer term. The pilot, even where it did not necessarily achieve 
its objectives, was sometimes of value in identifying blockage points, such as divergent interpreta-
tions of information governance between healthcare organisations, which, rather than necessitating 
articulation work, could be addressed openly. In doing so, they offered an opportunity for learning 
about what works, one of the multiple purposes of policy pilots (Bullock et al., 2001). In this respect, 
workarounds might, if attended to, allow adjustment of the direction of the pilot, if specific efforts 
are made to document and incorporate them, where judged to be of value, into formal organisation 
(Campbell, 2011).
Poor design- reality fit is to some extent to be expected within pilot projects, which, by their na-
ture, tend to allow for limited prior planning by participants. Added to this, the emphasis on inter- 
organisational collaboration in this particular pilot entailed a further level of ‘fit’ in the form of 
interoperability issues to be grappled with, namely the degree of concordance between systems and 
processes in different organisations. Finally, the contingency of the changes trialed as part of the pilot, 
depending on the purpose(s) of piloting being emphasised, can mean they are of uncertain duration, 
with some rejected, while others are incorporated into day to day practices.
Learning from workarounds that perform articulation work is curtailed when they are rendered 
invisible in pursuit of a ‘successful’ pilot. On the other hand, ensuring scope for learning would allow 
policies to be modified and make them more adaptive to implementation in conditions different to 
those under which they were developed (Swanson et al., 2010).
Policy pilots
While Alter's (2014) theory of workarounds posits an organisational infrastructure of rules, practices, and 
norms that are variously worked around by employees, this does not accord with the context of pilot pro-
jects. This is because policy pilots are intended to suspend a range of processes and practices in the interests 
of facilitating innovation (Bailey et al., 2017). The encouragement, facilitation or at least permitting of 
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informal practices in the pilot that gives license to workers to do what's needed to make the change happen, 
manifests a ‘state of exception’ that is characteristic of projectified work (Cicmil et al., 2016; Bailey et al., 
2019). In a project context, therefore, workarounds cannot be straightforwardly conceptualised as unsanc-
tioned behaviour or resistance to new systems and processes. This reflects a subtle understanding of worka-
rounds as sophisticated strategies and responses to standardisation of work practices and other disciplinary 
techniques and norms (Davison et al., 2019). Within a pilot, the new ways of working being tested may pre-
sent professionals with decisions to make about multiple competing sets of ‘rules’. Where new and existing 
rules come into conflict, then individuals must decide which take precedence, weighing up, for example, 
ability to access patients' records to support patient safety against navigating an unfamiliar electronic patient 
records system, or providing certain patient data to other healthcare organisations against upholding local 
information governance rules. In the context of pilots, therefore, workarounds become political because 
workers are required to make decisions about which rules to comply with and when to deploy workarounds. 
The political pressure to make the pilot work points to the ambiguity of policy piloting in terms of whether 
it functions on a rational level as an experiment, or functions in the interests of policymakers by providing 
evidence of ‘successful’ policymaking (Ettelt et al., 2015; Nair and Howlett, 2016). In this way, the mul-
tiple purposes and agendas at work within policy pilots point to differing perspectives on change projects, 
and it is within this context that workarounds are deployed, and alternately problematised and justified.
Implications for the workforce
Delivering a policy pilot through extensive use of workarounds that intensify work passes risk from 
policymakers onto staff. One way in which this is manifested is where pilots that are deemed suc-
cessful lead to the continuation of the new and enhanced services as ‘business as usual’ without 
any additional resources. Workarounds may create the illusion that dysfunctional systems are indeed 
functioning such that continued operation with the status quo allows further dysfunction to emerge 
(Morrison, 2015). In this way, when the initiation phase ends, pilots may undermine the organisation's 
ability to move to full implementation of policy by encouraging workarounds that obscure the true 
resource costs of new processes. Professionals who deploy workarounds are arguably therefore com-
plicit in enabling their skillful articulation work to go unacknowledged and to be taken for granted, 
thereby participating in their own exploitation (Contu and Willmott, 2003; Morrison, 2015; Cicmil 
et al., 2016). The requirement for frontline employees to nuance standardised ways of working to 
fit local requirements and to bridge between different localities, such as by logging in to multiple 
booking systems, constitutes responsibilisation of the workforce. Staff using their knowledge of local 
systems and processes to make changes more feasible may be considered a form of empowerment. 
However, if the organisation devolves responsibility to staff without sufficient license or scope to 
shape work practices, then it may, conversely, be seen as exploitative.
Exceptional circumstances that define a project put pressure on workers to make a project work and 
to achieve project aims to deadlines and invoke a state of crisis associated with projectification that 
sees these circumstances and demands accepted as the norm (Cicmil et al., 2016; Bailey et al., 2019). 
This was seen in our study in the case of manual workarounds such as reception staff having to access 
6 different appointment systems, or hospital ward managers generating ad hoc reports for use by GPs. 
In the context of healthcare organisations, capacity to cope with changes is undermined when services 
are delivered via new practices that are inadequately resourced, putting those services and the safety 
of patients at risk and potentially lending the pilot project only short- lived success.
The suspension of the ordinary ‘rules of engagement’ arising from a projectified state of exception 
in policy piloting can result in governance of processes and accountability for decisions made being 
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tacitly dropped (Bailey et al., 2019). The tacit endorsement of workarounds, which involves ‘turning a 
blind eye’ to the suspension of governance arrangements, generates organisational risks during change 
projects in addition to those generated for individuals.
Theorising workarounds
In the context of a pilot project, we have seen that workarounds can be considered simultaneously 
‘good’ and ‘bad’, and therefore ambiguous. They may be disruptive and undermining of the pilot 
project from the perspective of the purpose of pilots as demonstrators of pre- determined objectives 
(in this case, new collaborative processes and practices). However, if the pilot is treated as an adap-
tive process, emphasising its experimental purpose, then workarounds can be viewed as constructive. 
Workarounds may also be seen in a positive light where they are deployed to enable new processes 
and practices through articulation work, necessary due to their inevitably imperfect fit with existing 
processes and practices. Where workarounds are supportive of the pilot project, they can nevertheless 
be detrimental to the workforce, who are burdened with more onerous work processes. Conversely, 
when workarounds are viewed as disruptive, they make manifest frontline professionals' decision- 
making about the competing priorities of supporting the pilot, or upholding and adhering to principles 
and standards (whether formal or informal) that conflict with pilot processes and practices.
While the literature recognises that there are both local and broader consequences of workarounds 
(Alter, 2014), our findings indicate that these consequences go beyond generating further workarounds in 
the wider organisation, adding a further temporal dimension. When workarounds are deployed, they have 
‘local’ consequences. This is, as we have seen, because they cause others to deploy workarounds that can 
involve more onerous processes. However, they may also have longer- term consequences through generat-
ing additional hidden workload that may ultimately affect the sustainability of those processes. This high-
lights the way in which the temporality of workarounds noted in relation to their temporariness (Kobayashi 
et al., 2005; Morrison, 2015) intersects with that of pilot projects, which are themselves time- limited.
CONCLUSIONS
This article challenges prima facie understandings of the enabling / undermining role of workarounds 
in policy pilots. In contrast to workarounds being seen as either disruptive and problematic or con-
structive and skillful practices, this study has found that in technology- led pilot projects workarounds 
can be conceptualised as simultaneously valuable and problematic and are therefore ambiguous.
Workarounds can make it possible to push through change within limited project timescales and 
minimise short- term disruption within the project context. However, they can produce unstable work-
ing conditions that make employees vulnerable through responsibilisation that takes the form of 
intensified work during pilots and under- resourcing after pilots have ended in ways that perpetuate in-
tensified work. Workarounds are crucial to the tensions between the short- term time horizons of pilots 
and more enduring work practices, drawing attention to the temporal dynamics across different phases 
within organisational change. At the intersection of digital transformation with the project form, work-
arounds become not only inevitable but necessary to make the project work. This means that there is 
to some extent a trade- off between pilot success now and a potential longer- term detrimental impact 
on the organisation and its workforce. In this respect, it is not only the case that workarounds have 
implications for pilot projects, but also that pilot projects have implications for workarounds.
By deviating from standard practices and protocols, workarounds in health care may generate risks 
to patient safety (Spear and Schmidhofer, 2005; Debono et al., 2010, Blijleven et al., 2017), where high 
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levels of formal organisation and governance exist to maintain minimum standards of safe care. New risks 
emerge as work done under the carte blanche mandate of pilots is not properly governed, and we might 
therefore see the pilot itself as a workaround of existing protocols and governance rules. Alternate positive 
and negative characterisations of workarounds therefore reflect the balance between the competing goods 
of innovation and accountability (Campbell 2011) in allowing ‘creative subversion’ that sets aside the 
normal governance to enable new ways of working to be trialed, versus maintaining robust governance.
As informal and invisible practices, workarounds present a double- edged sword for professionals 
because their tacit acceptance licenses a degree of autonomy in the ‘interpretation’ of changes in the 
local context, which is demanded by the pilot context. However, this work is not acknowledged or 
legitimised, and therefore, it subjects individuals to the risks of overwork and the organisation to the 
risks from a lack of governance (Bailey et al., 2019). In contrast to the rhetoric of empowerment as-
sociated with policy pilots, then, while workarounds are a manifestation of professionals' autonomy, 
their association with change projects, projectification and intensified work means that the ‘win- win’ 
is elusive for frontline professionals (Ekman, 2015). Our findings bring to the fore political dimensions 
of workarounds that have not previously been addressed. Workarounds are inherently political whether 
employees engage in resistance to changes or in configuration and articulation work to tailor changes 
to their local context. The NHS' uniquely multi- professional make- up intensifies these politics through 
competing agendas. We might also acknowledge that in the act of making some practices formal and 
visible, for example in standards and protocols, other practices, such as articulation work, are rendered 
invisible (Star and Bowker, 2007; Bailey et al., 2020). This implies that workarounds are both necessary 
to the rules and protocols that define them and also necessarily invisible.
New technology- led work practices rather than simply slotting neatly into the place of old practices 
are interwoven, through the use of workarounds, into wider networks of existing practices. In this way, 
workarounds are enablers of change but they also threaten continued stability, meaning that the disrup-
tive innovation of technological change projects may easily become entrenched disruption for frontline 
employees if attention is not paid to workarounds as critical features of the organisational change process.
This article contributes to theory and practice in terms of the applicability of our findings not only 
within the healthcare context or indeed that of policy pilots, but in organisational change contexts more 
broadly. In conclusion, there is a need for explicit acknowledgement of workarounds and the tensions/
trade- offs they engender in terms of short- and longer- term impacts on pilot projects, the workforce 
and the organisation. In doing so, we can go beyond their conceptualisation as positive or negative and 
treat them as an ambivalent and conflicted but essential resource for more adaptive change.
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APPENDIX 1
TABLE A1 Checklist description of the demonstrator pilot sites
Item number Item
1 BRIEF NAME
Site A: Pro- active case management for care home residents
2 WHY
High ambulance and GP callouts to care homes; too many non- elective admissions to hospital; 
Care home residents having long lengths of stay in hospital; lack of access to clinical (GP) 
records from care homes.
Goals: to improve access to clinical care outside hospital, specifically reducing GP and 
ambulance call- outs, hospital attendances and admissions, to facilitate integrated records 




Pro- active case management for adult residents, most aged 65+, of five care homes, registered 
with one of three general practices in one CCG area. Risk- stratifying care home residents 
and providing enhanced care planning, including end of life and crisis planning, using risk 
stratification.
Procedure: Care home residents were risk stratified, using the model previously employed 
in Greater Lever. For each, the case manager, carried out an initial, face- to- face holistic 
assessment and put a care plan in place, which was recorded on the GP system using a template.
At the start of the demonstrator, the case manager had access to general practice records via a 
computer in her office, partway through the demonstrator, she acquired direct read– write access 
to the records via a laptop. After the initial assessment, the case manager would manage patients 
using a video conferencing facility.
Materials: General practices involved used EMISa, Visiona and TPPa, laptop provided to the case 
manager
5 WHO
The service was provided by an advanced nurse practitioner (ANP) who worked during the 
demonstrator as a case manager (seconded from an acute trust), with input from care home 
carers and managers, GPs, practice managers and other administrative staff, a CCG pharmacist 
and members of the local Mental Health Trust's dementia team. CCG and CSU project 
managers and the integrated care lead (from the local Foundation Trust) also contributed
6 HOW
An initial face- to- face assessment, followed by case management of patients using a video 
conferencing facility, with the ANP ‘ringing in’ to run through the residents on her caseload 
with care home staff, hearing about any changes and performing consultations with 
patients, where necessary
7 WHERE
The assessments and consultations took place in care homes, additional work was undertaken 
in general practices.
8 WHEN AND HOW MUCH
Each care home resident had one initial assessment and then consultations were performed as 
required.
9 TAILORING
Individual assessments were undertaken and care plans produced for each care home resident 
receiving case management
(Continues)
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Item number Item
10 MODIFICATIONS
In practice, the video conferencing technology was not used for both technical and 
organisational reasons. Rather, the care home staff contacted the ANP by telephone, to 
discuss residents or to ask her to visit the home. Notably, when at a home, the ANP was 




Site B: Additional availability appointments
2 WHY
Difficulty for patients in obtaining timely and convenient access to general practice; too many 
emergency hospital admissions.
Goals: To improve access to care, specifically providing quicker and more convenient access to 




Additional availability appointments for registered patients of five practices in a township plus 
one other three miles away, (c. 33,000)
Procedure: Additional availability appointments were provided by two GPs, working 6.30 p.m. 
to 8 p.m. Monday to Friday and 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. at weekends. Three of the practices 
involved were housed within a purpose— built primary care centre; two of these practices 
and the practice located outside Radcliffe were owned by the same GP partner. Most 
appointments were pre- booked, with six kept as emergency appointments for allocation 
after 6 p.m. From 6 p.m., the practice phone lines diverted to A Healthier Radcliffe.
Materials: The appointment booking system was hosted at one practice and the other five 
logged into this to book appointments. All six practices used Vision with access to the 
full record, allowed through a data sharing agreement on a read– write basis. GPs used a 
smartcard to log into each practice system
5 WHO
Two GPs and receptionists
6 HOW
Face- to- face appointments
7 WHERE
GP practices
8 WHEN AND HOW MUCH
Patients booked appointments as required. Each appointment was 10 min in length, 18 








Site C: Additional availability appointments; responsiveness appointments; homelessness 
service; extension of specialist advice lines
TABLE A1 (Continued)
(Continues)




Some patients being unable to access timely GP appointments; patients with long- term 
conditions not having timely access to a healthcare professional; insufficient healthcare 
provision for homeless people.
Goals: To improve access to care, specifically reducing A&E attendances, by providing urgent 
same day (responsiveness) and additional availability appointments in general practice. To 
improve specialist primary care services and reduce secondary care planned activity, by 
shifting specialist service provision from secondary to primary care
3 WHAT
1. Additional availability appointments (33/35 practices).
Procedure: Additional availability appointments were provided at four ‘host’ practices. The 
additional availability appointments were provided by 1 GP at each site, between 6 p.m. 
and 8 p.m. Monday to Friday, and 9 a.m. to 11 a.m. at weekends. The participating practices 
across the CCG area and A&E at the local acute trust booked appointments at the host 
practice, which were available on a quota basis, until 1 p.m. and then made available on a 
first come first served basis.
Materials: Practices logged into the host practice's system. All practices ran EMIS, either EMIS 
web or as streaming practices with access to the full record, allowed through a data sharing 
agreement, on a read- only basis
4 2. Responsiveness appointments (31/35 practices);
Procedure: Practices fitted the responsiveness appointments within the regular working hours 
of the practice. For example, one practice allocated four telephone triage slots and four 
appointments to the on— call doctor and two appointments each to all other doctors (the 
number of doctors in the practice varied).
Materials: a macro was put onto each practice system and used to log the outcome of 
appointment.
3. Homelessness service (1 practice);
Procedure: provided under a Locally Enhanced Service arrangement, run at a practice with a 
large local homeless population (often transient). A health questionnaire for patients was 
completed, to ascertain health needs and then the patient was signposted to various services 
(clinics for dressings, immunisations, substance misuse services), several of which operated 
from the same premises as the practice.
4. Extension of specialist advice lines;
Procedure: The ‘specialist advice lines’ were a facility for GPs to get advice from hospital 
consultants. The service was pre- existing and the additional specialities were added as part 
of the demonstrator.
Materials: Advice lines operated through a dedicated email address for GPs to use
5 WHO
The additional availability appointments were provided by 1 GP at each site, supported by 
two reception staff, Lead organisation was a GP federation; some additional availability 
appointments were staffed by locum GPs; the A&E department could refer into the 
additional availability appointments, local voluntary services could refer into the 
homelessness service. Hospital consultants staffed the advice lines
6 HOW
Appointments took place face to face and via the telephone
TABLE A1 (Continued)
(Continues)





8 WHEN AND HOW MUCH
Patients booked appointments as required. Each additional availability appointment was 10 min 




Some changes to the original timings and booking arrangements were made. The weekday 
additional availability appointments were originally offered entirely on a quota basis and 
the weekend appointments continued until 12 p.m. It appeared some GPs ended up seeing 
the patient again in normal surgery hours after the additional availability appointment, 
because they were unsure about what had happened at the appointment. Some practices did 
not participate in providing the responsiveness appointments; Reasons for non- participation 
included a lack of capacity in the practice for responsiveness, concerns around IG for one 
practice and proximity, and being situated on the CCG geographical border
Item number Item
1 BRIEF NAME
Site D: Additional availability appointments; GP- led care planning; multi- skilled care worker 
led care planning; hospital navigator service
2 WHY
Too much demand on general practice; ‘inappropriate’ use of A&E for problems that could be 
handled in general practice; A&E used by frail elderly that resulted in avoidable admissions; 
increase in A&E attendances from 1 p.m. onwards (when practices are open).
Goals: To develop integrated care in line with the CCG strategy. To improve access to care, 
specifically access to general practice, reduced A&E attendances and hospital admissions. 
To improve care of the frail elderly through care planning. To develop the IT infrastructure, 
specifically to allow hub clinicians to access patients' records, allow practices and patients 
to book appointments at the hub (a GP practice), and let practices know when their patients 
are in hospital
3 WHAT
1. Additional availability appointments for patients registered with GPs in one locality.
Procedure: A hub was set up to provide additional GP and nurse appointments, with three 
nurse clinics and three GP sessions each day. GPs provided additional appointments 4 p.m. 
to 9 p.m. on weekdays and 10 a.m. to 8 p.m. at weekends. Practices ran the appointment 
bookings until 6 p.m., after which time patients could phone and book directly. The acute 
trust provided a late- night path laboratory collection.
Materials: Four practices used EMIS, two used Vision. Host practice accessed summary care 
record on Adastra* on a read- only basis.
2. Care planning
Procedure: GPs produced care plans for their frailest elderly patients. The multi- skilled care 
worker visited patients aged 85 and over at home to identify and assess their needs and 
produce a care plan
TABLE A1 (Continued)
(Continues)
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Item number Item
4 3. Navigator service
Procedure: The navigator kept track of presentations to one local A&E department, focussing 
particularly on those aged 65 and over, so tended to see patients with confusion, falls and 
long- term conditions, particularly multiple sclerosis and chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease. She assessed each patient (each patient was also assessed by the medical team 
and had tests done as appropriate). Where patients were medically fit and did not need to 
be admitted, the navigator took responsibility for ensuring that the relevant support was 
in place, either in the form of a placement, if they were not safe to return home, or home 
support services (e.g. from team providing crisis response)
5 WHO
The project lead was a GP. Local out of hours provider (supplied GPs and receptionists for 
additional availability appointments); the navigator was an occupational therapist based at a 
local general hospital, the multi- skilled care worker was based at a foundation trust
6 HOW
See ‘procedure’ for a description of how each component operated
7 WHERE
Additional availability appointments took place in person, at GP practices, care planning took 
places in GP practices and at patients' homes, the navigator service operated in hospital
8 WHEN AND HOW MUCH
Patients booked appointments as required. Each additional availability appointment was 15 min 
in length, 28 appointments per day were provided Monday– Friday, 51 on Saturday and 24 
on Sunday
9 TAILORING
Care plans were prepared for individual patients. The navigator service arranged tailored care 
packages for patients
10 MODIFICATIONS
The additional availability GP appointments were typically booked, but the nursing ones were 
less popular and were replaced with GP appointments after six weeks. Issues arose as 
practices which had been allocated appointments were unwilling to give up their allocated 
slots to other practices which had filled theirs
Item number Item
1 BRIEF NAME
Site E: Additional availability appointments; mental health crisis clinics
2 WHY
Too much demand on general practice; lack of an accessible mental health service locally.
Goals: To improve access to care, specifically providing quicker and more convenient access to 
routine primary care, reducing attendances at A&E and increasing access to mental health 
services, by extending access to routine primary care and providing additional mental 
health services in the community.
To make better use of local resources and support the local population to do this, specifically 
to reduce attendances at A&E, reduce hospital admissions and facilitate quicker discharge 
from hospital, by providing signposting and education to local services in the community, 
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3 WHAT
1. Additional availability appointments for patients registered with GPs in one locality.
Procedure: The general practice additional availability appointments ran from the lead practice. 
A purposely developed Care Diary was used by GPs, the local out of hours provider and 
A&E staff to book patients into the additional availability appointments. Patients were 
triaged at A&E and, if the ailment could be managed in the community, they could be 
booked into a GP or nurse appointment by staff at A&E using the Care Diary.
Materials: six practices used EMIS, two used Vision. EMIS practices were able to share records 
on a read- only basis, Vision practices were not able to access records. Since December 2014 
all practices have been EMIS web allowing all to share records on a read- only basis
4 2. Mental health crisis clinics for patients registered with GPs in one locality.
Procedure: The clinics were organised by a trained counsellor, who co- ordinated the service and 
provided appointments, plus other counsellors (and trainees) who also worked at another local 
general practice. Appointments were provided between 6.30 p.m. and 9.30 p.m., Monday to 
Friday
5 WHO
The project lead was a GP. The additional availability appointments were provided to registered 
patients, at the lead practice, by GPs, supported by receptionists, all supplied by the local Out 
of Hours provider. The mental health appointments were provided by trained counsellors and 
counselling students. The demonstrator appointed a dedicated project manager partway through. 
CSU and EMIS also contributed to the project
6 HOW
See ‘procedure’ for a description of how each component operated
7 WHERE
In person, at GP practices
8 WHEN AND HOW MUCH
Patients booked appointments as required. The additional availability appointments were each 10 min 
in length and 18 appointments were provided per day, Monday– Sunday. The mental health 
appointments were each one hour in length and three per day were provided, Monday– Friday
9 TAILORING
10 MODIFICATIONS
The additional availability GP appointments were typically booked, but the nursing ones were less 
popular. Issues arose as practices which had been allocated appointments were unwilling to give 
up their allocated slots to other practices which had filled theirs. Some local GP practices did not 
refer patients to the mental health appointments, the lead GP was aware of this but the reasons 
for non- engagement are not known
Item number Item
1 BRIEF NAME
Site F: Rapid response step- up service; complex care service; enhanced end of life service; 
carer needs assessment service; mental health liaison, care homes; end of life training, care 
homes and locality
2 WHY
Too many non- elective hospital admissions; too many patients dying in hospital; district nurses 
were under pressure and did not have enough time to provide the right end of life care and 
support to patients and carers.
Goals: To proactively identify and manage people with complex needs via a core integrated 
team that can draw on specialist support when necessary. To support people with heart 
failure by extending telehealth services. Support for people to be maintained in their own 
home or care home where this is their preferred place prior to and including death. A 
reduction in unplanned, avoidable non- elective activity prior to and including death
TABLE A1 (Continued)
(Continues)
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Item number Item
3 WHAT
Overall: The demonstrator was part of the restructuring across health and social care, through 
the development of an ‘integrated hub’ in each CCG locality. The demonstrator took place 
in one locality, where the first hub had been established. The hub premises accommodated 
social workers and third sector staff. Stockport had shared patient information via the 
Stockport Health record which enabled GPs, secondary care and Out of Hours services to 
access each other's systems. An extension of the Stockport Health Record, to include health 
and social care data and integrated care plans, was planned to support the implementation 
of the Stockport One Integrated Care Team and was further developed within the 
demonstrator community demonstrator to ensure that the whole range of services within 
the hub had appropriate access to information. In terms of specific systems operating 
locally, social care used CareFirst, district nurses used DominiC, the REaCH service used 
Staffplan, and domiciliary workers users used CM2000 (to log each visit)
4 1. Rapid response step- up service provided to people aged 18 and over.
Procedure: GPs referred into the service via a dedicated number at a contact centre when 
they felt a patient did not need to go to hospital, but needed support putting rapidly in 
place. Once the GP had made the referral, the patient received a response within 2 h from 
a team comprising a district nurse and a social worker. The patient could be maintained 
in their own home or go into a step- up bed. This service ran from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. and the 
intermediate care service provided an Out of Hours service.
Materials: six practices used EMIS, two used Vision. EMIS practices were able to share 
records on a read- only basis, Vision practices were not able to access records. Since 
December 2014 all practices have been EMIS web allowing all to share records on a read- 
only basis.
2. Complex care service
Procedure: the population was risk stratified. Multidisciplinary teams (MDTs), involving 
a GP and a practice nurse, worked to agree an integrated pathway and model of care 
for individual patients. The work undertaken followed the same basis as the GP care 
plans which had already been developed, but allowed other healthcare professionals to 
contribute to these. The task of coordinating the care plan was undertaken by various 
professionals (GPs, district nurses, social workers) and also voluntary sector workers. The 
multidisciplinary group (MDG) was a wider network of professionals which operated at a 
more strategic level, looking across the locality and identifying, for example, high rates of 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and considering what action should be taken, rather 
than necessarily focussing only on patients within the high- risk stratification.
Materials: the People at Risk of Readmission tool was used for risk stratification
3. End of life care service
Procedure: The end of life care service was newly designed service that focussed on 
integrating health and social care. This is a jointly delivered service between district 
nursing (health) and assistant practitioners (social care) in the community. The service 
delivers end of life care to people in the last weeks and days of life undertaking joint 
assessments, care planning and visiting the person in their home to deliver interventions 
that meet the needs of the patient and their carers or family.
The health and well- being service was planned as an extension of the existing service, into a 
different area. The end of life training consisted of delivering a module to care home staff. 
The dementia- focussed training consisted of several one- hour training sessions delivered to 
care home staff.
Materials: End of life training based on the Six Steps programme and providing follow- up 
telephone support.
4. The mental health liaison in- reach service involved working with three care homes to 
provide advice and support, particularly care planning
TABLE A1 (Continued)
(Continues)
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5 WHO
The demonstrator was part of a programme of work developed by the CCG and local authority, 
a hub was established and a hub co- ordinator was employed; the local Foundation Trust, 
Community mental health trust and local authority reablement service were involved; 
Project managers and general practice staff contributed. The MDT and MDGs were 
comprised of GPs, district nurses, social workers, primary care pharmacist and third sector 
staff. The end of life service was provided by assistant practitioners (domiciliary workers) 
from the REaCH service. The end of life training for care homes was provided by end of 
life facilitators. The health and well- being service was led by project managers, liaising 
with general practice staff. The carer assessments were carried out in general practice, with 
input from GPs and administrative staff. The mental health liaison in- reach service was 
provided by a community psychiatric nurse and a support worker
6 HOW
All services were provided in person
7 WHERE
At GP practices, in patients' homes, in step- up facilities, care homes
8 WHEN AND HOW MUCH
Services were provided to patients as required
9 TAILORING
10 MODIFICATIONS
The aim was for district nurses to be co- located at the hub but this was not possible within the 
timeframes associated with the demonstrator. In practice, social workers were ‘paperless’ 
while district nurses used paper records
From: Implementing new care models: learning from the Greater Manchester demonstrator pilot experience, Elvey et al. (2018).
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